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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism behind the evolution of cooperation. Oishi et al. analyt-
ically showed the formation of two exclusive groups under the KANDORI assessment rule in the
case of perfect information and no implementation error, regardless of the population size N . Here,
we numerically show the formation of many exclusive groups under the JUDGING assessment rule
in the same case. Introducing degrees of exclusive groups, we numerically examine the stability of
the group formation under imperfect information and implementation error.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation.[1] One fea-
ture of indirect reciprocity is that helpful acts are returned, not by the recipient as in direct
reciprocation, but by third parties: players collect information about other player’s behavior,
and determine their actions by using this information. This behavior requires the following
two modules: (a) an assessment rule for the acts of others as good or bad, and (b) an action
rule specifying how to act toward others based on that assessment.
Assessment rules are classified into three types, depending on what information they use.
A first-order assessment rule only takes into account whether a donor X helps a recipient
Y . A second-order assessment rule takes also into account the image of the recipient Y . A
third-order assessment rule additionally takes into account the image of the donor X .
Assuming binary assessments, Ohtsuki and Iwasa [2, 3] showed that among the resulting
possible strategies, only eight lead to a stable regime of mutual cooperation under public
and perfect information about others. These are called the leading eight.
On the other hand, Uchida [4] examined the effects of private and imperfect information as
well as those of implementation errors. Although Uchida concluded that private information
leads to the collapse of the sterner (KANDORI[5]) assessment rule, the results presented
here are somewhat different.
Oishi et. al.[6] showed the emergence of two exclusive groups in the JUDGING assessment
rule when information is perfect and private. In this study, we numerically examine the
stability of the exclusive groups under imperfect information and implementation errors.
Furthermore, we numerically show the emergence of many exclusive groups in the third-
order (JUDGING) assessment rule.
II. MODEL AND METHODS
We consider the donation game defined as follows: there are N players, each with their
own opinion as to whether each of the other players is good (G) or bad (B) (image matrix).
βij(t) ∈ G,B represents player i’s opinion of player j at a round t. Each element of the
image matrix at the initial round t = 1, is G with probability p or B with probability 1− p.
The probability p is called the initial trust probability and 0 < p < 1.
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The game is repeated over a large number of rounds. In each round, one player is
randomly chosen as a donor and another as a recipient. It is the donor’ choice whether to
cooperate or defect. We assume the decision follows an action rule. If the donor cooperates,
the payoff of the donor, −c, is less than 0 and that of the recipient, b, is greater than 0. If
the donor defects, the payoffs of both players are 0. We assume b ≥ c.
All players observe which player is the donor, which is the recipient, and what the donor
does to the recipient. Then, all players independently revise their own opinion on the donor
based on the observation and their assessment rule.
Here we use only one action rule, namely that the donor only cooperates with recipients
whom the donor regards as good. On the other hand, we mainly study two assessment rules,
which are called the KANDORI and JUDGING ones. In Table 1, we show definitions of the
assessment rules used in this paper.
We consider two types of noises, following Uchida’s paper.[4] We investigate the effect of
imperfect information, in which each interaction is only observed by a fraction, q < 1, of
the population. We also study the effect of implementation error ǫ, which is the probability
that an intended help is not actually given.
TABLE I. Assessment of the donor as G (good) or B (bad) by observers after the donor cooperates
with (C), or defects from (D) the recipient. Observers have pre-assessments of the donor and the
recipient as to whether they are good or bad.
pre-assessment to the donor good bad
pre-assessment to the recipient good bad good bad
cooperate(C) or defect(D) C D C D C D C D
All C G G G G G G G G
All D B B B B B B B B
SCORING G B G B G B G B
TYPE 1 G B G G G B G G
KANDORI G B B G G B B G
STANDING G B G G G B G B
JUDGING G B B G G B B B
3
III. RESULTS USING THE KANDORI ASSESSMENT RULE
First, we show our results in the case of the KANDORI assessment rule.
A. The case of q = 1 and ǫ = 0
We first consider the case of perfect infomation, q = 1, and no implementation error,
ǫ = 0. Oishi et al.[6] analytically investigated this case and showed the formation of two
exclusive groups with ratios of p and 1− p, irrespective of the population size, N .
B. The case of q < 1 and ǫ = 0
In this case, the results depend upon the initial state of the image matrix, βij(t = 1),
and the number of players, N . We consider two initial states of an image matrix for some p
(0 < p < 1), namely 1) a random initial state that is randomly set to G with a probability p
or B with a probabilty 1− p, and 2) a uniform initial state where two exclusive groups with
ratios p and 1−p are initially formed. In the latter case, we easily confirm that imperfection
of the information, 1− q, does not destroy the two exclusive groups.
In the former case, we can see that, after a large number of rounds and sorting (see
Appendix A), two imperfect exclusive groups still appear for small N and small 1 − q, as
seen in Fig. 1. Here, we introduce the degree of the two exclusive groups, DEG1, as follows:
DEG1 =
1
N2
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
sign(β1j)β1iβji. (1)
DEG1 is equal to one when the two exclusive groups are perfectly formed, and becomes
zero when they are destroyed. In Fig. 2, the results of DEG1 versus q are shown for
N = 100, 200, and 400. For larger numbers of players, we can see that smaller values of the
incompleteness of the information, 1− q, disturbs the formation of the two exclusive groups
from a random initial state.
C. The case of q = 1 and ǫ > 0
After a large number of rounds, two groups appear. Players within the same group have
the same opinions; those in different groups have opposite opinions. The two groups are not
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FIG. 1. Image matrix βij at the 20,000th round starting with a random initial state, where
N=100, q=0.99, p=0.8, and ǫ = 0.
FIG. 2. DEG1 versus q for N = 100, 200 and 400 after a large number of rounds from a random
initial state, where p = 0.7 and ǫ = 0 and the error bars show a standard deviation of 10 samples
with different random numbers.
necessarily exclusive. In Fig. 3, we show that DEG1 linearly decreases with ǫ, irrespective
of the population size N .
D. The case of q < 1 and ǫ > 0
In contrast with the case of q < 1 and ǫ = 0, there is no dependence upon different initial
states with the same p after a large number of rounds. In Fig. 4, the results of DEG1 versus
q are shown for N = 100, 200, and 400. We obtain results similar to the case where q < 1
and ǫ = 0 for a random initial state.
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FIG. 3. DEG1 versus ǫ for N=100, 200, and 400, where p=0.7 and q = 1; the error bars show
the standard deviation from 10 samples.
FIG. 4. DEG1 versus q for N=100, 200, and 400 after a large number of rounds, where p = 0.7
and ǫ = 0.1; the error bars show the standard deviation of 10 samples.
IV. RESULTS USING THE JUDGING ASSESSMENT RULE
We show results using the JUDGING assessment rule.
A. The case of q = 1 and ǫ = 0
Many exclusive groups are formed after a large number of rounds from a random initial
state at some p, where 0 < p < 1, as shown in Fig. 5. The sizes of these groups and their
frequencies depend upon p. Fig. 6 shows relations between group sizes and frequencies. The
larger the value of p, the greater the ease with which large groups are formed. When p is
small, it shows a behavior close to a power-low distribution. This distribution is almost the
same for different population sizes N , as shown in Fig. 7.
Because DEG1 is only applicable to two exclusive groups, we introduce the following
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FIG. 5. Image matrix βij at the 60,000th round from a random initial state, where N=100, p=0.7,
q=1, and ǫ=0.
FIG. 6. Relations between group size and frequency for p=0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9, where N=100,
q=1, and ǫ=0. The frequency is a sum over 100 samples.
function for the degree of the exclusive groups for the JUDGING assessment rule (DEG2):
DEG2 =
∑N
i=2
∑i−1
j=1(βij + 1)(βji + 1)/4∑N
i=2
∑i−1
j=1(βij + 1)/2
(2)
DEG2 is one when many exclusive groups are perfectly formed, and zero when they are
destroyed.@
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FIG. 7. Relations between group size and frequency for N=100 and 200, where p=0.7, q=1, and
ǫ=0. The frequency is a sum over 200 samples for N=100 and over 100 samples for N=200.
B. The case of q < 1 and ǫ = 0
In this case, many smaller exclusive groups are formed from a random initial state (see
Fig. 8), although DEG2 still remains one. Once the formation of exclusive groups has
been completed, imperfection of information, 1− q, does not change the state(i.e. the state
is stationary). This behavior results in a decrease in good assessments. Fig. 9 shows the
fraction of good assessments as a function of q.
C. The case of q = 1 and ǫ > 0
The degree of exclusive groups (DEG2) decreases almost linearly with ǫ, similar to the
case of the KANDORI assessment rule. This does not necessarily mean the collapse of the
group. As seen in Fig. 10, there are some white horizontal lines in addition to squares
representing the exclusive groups. This indicates that there are players to assess the players
in the different group as good: i.e., the exclusivity of the group formed in this case is not
complete.
D. The case of q < 1 and ǫ > 0
The degree of the exclusive groups(DEG2) decreases and groups are destroyed. We also
examine the stability against mutants with different assessment rules. We consider the world
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FIG. 8. Image matrix βij at the 60,000th round from a random initial state, where N=100, p=0.7,
q=0.7, and ǫ=0.
FIG. 9. Fraction of good assessments in the image matrix βij at the 60,000th round, starting
with a random initial state, where N=100, p=0.7, q=0.7, and ǫ=0. Error bars show the standard
deviation of 10 samples.
of players with two or three different assessment rules in Table 1, and compare the average
total payoffs. One example is shown in Fig. 11. The results show that, with the exception
of the STANDING mutants, the JUDGING players have a larger average payoff than that
of the other mutants, although DEG2 decreases in the case of q < 1 and ǫ > 0.
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FIG. 10. Image matrix βij at the 60,000th round starting with a random initial state, where
N=100, p=0.9, q=1, and ǫ=0.1.
FIG. 11. Average total payoff at the 60,000th round in the world of players with two assessment
rules (90 JUDGING players and 10 mutants), where N=100, p=0.7, q=0.9, ǫ=0.1, b=10, and c=5.
Error bars show the standard deviation of 10 samples.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We summarize the results of this study as follows:
1) In contrast with the claims of Uchida[4], imperfect information does not completely
destroy two exclusive groups in the KANDORI assessment rule. For a small population size
of N and small imperfect information 1− q, two incomplete exclusive groups are formed.
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2) Using the JUDGING assessment rule with q = 1 and ǫ = 0, many exclusive groups
appear from a random initial state with a trust probability p, where 0 < p < 1. Distributions
of the group sizes of exclusive groups show nearly power-law behaviors when p is small and
do not depend upon population size N . Incomplete information 1 − q does not decrease
the degree of exclusive groups (DEG2), but makes their group sizes smaller, resulting in an
increased number of bad assessments.
3) If b is sufficiently larger than c, JUDGING players have larger average payoffs than
mutants (other than STANDING mutants) with different assessment rules, as shown in
Table 1, even in the case where q < 1 and ǫ > 0.
The model investigated here has considerable limitations. Introducing more realistic
effects to the model may overcome the negative points of the JUDGING players (namely
smaller average payoffs than those of the STANDING players and an increased number of
bad assessments due to the incomplete information). One of the limitations is that players
have a very short memory: they determine their opinions of another player according to
their last observation of that player’s actions. In real life, images are likely to be based
on a longer memory. In fact, we observe that introducing a longer memory to the model
makes the two exclusive groups of KANDORI players more robust under incompleteness of
information[7].
The other limitation is that the images are binary in this model, whereas the moral world
is not just black or white. Tanabe et al. [8] investigated the indirect reciprocity with trinary
reputations and found that this model allows cooperation under the SCORING assessment
rule under some mild conditions. We may expect an increase in good assessments for the
JUDGING players under the imperfect information by changing the binary images into
trinary ones.
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Appendix A: Sorting image matrices
We sort image matrices to make their structure easier to see. First, matrices are sorted
based on the image of the first row. The columns are also sorted in the same order. At
this time, a white square is formed in the upper left corner. In the case of the KANDORI
assessment rule, a white square is also formed in the lower right corner, and sorting is
completed. However, in the case of the JUDGING assessment rule, the lower right area has
not been sorted. Therefore, the lower right area is sorted in the same way. This process is
repeated until sorting becomes impossible. Finally, many white squares are formed on the
diagonal of the image matrix. In other words, the players are divided into many exclusive
groups.
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